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The field of microcredit (otherwise known as microfinance, microlending, or 
microcapital) has expanded rapidly since the 1980s as an economic means of 
lifting people out of poverty. Generally, microcredit has been accepted as an 
effective method for empowering both individuals and communities. In recent 
years, however, critics have brought to light some of the problems associated 
with microlending, such as the complex socioeconomic factors that can cause 
loan programs to fail. These problems stem from the basic tenet of microfi-
nance: the need for lending programs to be managed locally in order to under-
stand the needs of a community and assess the sustainability of each project. 
Lending programs vary a great deal around the world due to cultural differ-
ences, and the success of each must be evaluated in a geographic context. The 
industry of microfinance cannot be standardized due to these vitally important 
differences, and there are few organizations which have the ability to watch 
over the practices of individual lenders. As a result, microfinance institutions 
are largely free to practice autonomously; this independence is vital to the suc-
cess of each project but also creates a void of authority.
This paper investigates the microfinance crisis of 2010 in Andhra Pradesh, India, during 
which a large number of Indian farmers committed suicide. The global community con-
nected the suicides to the excessive pressure of lending institutions on Indian villagers to 
repay exploitative loans, and the crisis now represents a major change in the international 
attitude towards microfinance. The deaths sparked global controversy about the lack of 
regulation in microfinance, which had allowed institutions to exploit the poor in the name 
of third-world development. In light of the developments in India, the microcredit industry 
warrants renewed investigation. This paper will investigate how the microcredit crisis in 
India reflects larger issues in the field of microcredit.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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History of Microcredit
Generally, banks only offer loans to people who can provide collateral in case they 
default on their loan payments. As a result, people without traditional forms of col-
lateral are usually unable to borrow sizable amounts of money to invest in a busi-
ness. Additionally, their financial standing is damaged by investments considered ‘ir-
responsible’ by lending banks, such as the payment of dowries. People who do not 
qualify for formal loans often participate in informal savings systems which have lim-
ited funds, rigid requirements, and little security (CGAP). ‘Loan sharks’ often exploit 
the poor, extorting their money by capitalizing on their lack of other financial options. 
The Microcredit Summit of 1997 defined microcredit as “programmes [which] extend 
small loans to very poor people for self-employment projects that generate income, allow-
ing them to care for themselves and their families.” Acknowledging that such programs 
vary from country to country, the Summit also discussed the defining criteria of microcredit 
and came up with several factors. Microcredit is defined by small size; target users (mi-
croentrepreneurs, low-income households); utilization (income generation and enterprise, 
community health and education); and terms and conditions (flexible, comprehendible, 
suited to local conditions). Across the globe, credit programs target different types of loan 
applicants and business investments; accordingly, their lending strategies and repayment 
plans vary. (Srinivas)
Microcredit was pioneered in Bangladesh, which experienced extreme poverty for 
decades. In 1974, Bangladesh experienced widespread famine and countless Bangladeshis 
died in the streets as the government struggled in vain to provide enough food. At the 
time, Muhammad Yunus was an associate professor of economics at the University of 
Chittagong, in southeastern Bangladesh. Witnessing the suffering inspired him to inves-
tigate why Bangladeshis were unable to feed themselves. He visited the nearby town of 
Jobra and brought students to help improve its farmers’ agricultural productivity. While 
working with the villagers, Yunus discovered that the very poorest were trapped in a cycle 
of borrowing-and-repaying to make a living and were unable to advance because they had 
no capital of their own. Specifically, Yunus observed women whose entire income came 
from making bamboo stools but who earned only pennies each day due to exorbitant inter-
est rates on their raw materials. He learned that these 42 women owed a total of $27 to their 
suppliers, and that their permanent debt prevented them from earning any profit. Yunus felt 
ashamed that such a small amount of money was stopping the women from escaping the 
cycle of debt. Realizing that the villagers already had marketable skills that required no 
further training (farming, cooking, sewing), Yunus decided that they needed access to loans 
with reasonable terms. (Yunus 1998)
By 1975, Yunus had become a full professor of economics and been named the 
director of the Rural Economics Programme at Chittagong University. In 1976, Yunus 
launched the Grameen Bank Project in Jobra to experiment with a credit system that would 
provide banking services for the rural poor. Grameen (“Village”) Bank opened with the 
five following objectives:
• Extend banking facilities to the poor
• Eliminate exploitation of the poor
• Promote self-employment for rural, unemployed Bangladeshis
• Include the most disadvantaged (especially women) in leadership roles
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• Reverse the cycle of “low income, low saving & low investment” to “low 
income, injection of credit, investment, more income, more savings, more 
investment, more income”
Grameen flourished and received sponsorship from several banks. The project was ex-
tended to another district in 1979, and, with continued success, to several others (Grameen 
Bank a).
In October 1983, the government of Bangladesh passed special legislation to trans-
form the Grameen Bank Project into an independent bank. Currently, borrowers of the 
Grameen Bank own 95% of its shares, while 5% of shares are owned by the government 
of Bangladesh. As of September 2011, Grameen had lent money to 8.34 million borrowers, 
96% of whom are women. Grameen has lent a total of $11.21 billion since inception, with 
an unprecedented loan recovery rate of 96.53%. Further, Grameen offers reduced interest 
rates on loans: 20% for income-generating loans, 8% for housing loans, 5% for student 
loans, and 0% for loans to ‘Struggling Members’ (beggars). In contrast, the Bangladeshi 
government offers a 22% interest rate on loans and the Microcredit Regulatory Authority 
suggests a range of 25-33% interest rates. As a measure of success, the Grameen Bank 
estimates that since its opening in 1983, 68% of borrowers’ families have risen above the 
poverty line (Grameen Bank b 2011).
With the Grameen Bank, Yunus developed an innovative lending technique that re-
sulted in unprecedented success. He lent to poor female heads-of-households, who proved 
more reliable than men because they invested the loans directly in their families rather 
than repaying previous debt. Yunus also realized that Bangladeshis would be motivated to 
repay loans if they felt socially obligated to do so (a sort of ‘social collateral’). Therefore, 
he extended loans to groups, correctly predicting that a sense of collective responsibility 
and fear of public shame would discourage loan defaults. Loaning to ‘joint liability groups’ 
resulted in unparalleled rates of repayment, which in turn enabled him to offer more loans 
to the poorest villagers. Yunus’s model requires prompt repayment of small loans (usually 
around $250) which allows money to be recycled quickly to new borrowers (Rai 2011). 
Due to such radical lending practices, Yunus witnessed exceptional rates of repayment. He 
is now considered the pioneer of microfinance and still works to promote Grameen and 
other international microcredit ventures.
After the founding and rapid growth of the Grameen Bank, international interest in 
microcredit grew dramatically. Other microenterprise programs adopted Yunus’s model by 
helping poor women invest in small businesses, allowing them to retain assets and thereby 
better their households. In the 1980s, social entrepreneurs in India established self-help 
groups (SHGs) of 10-20 women and then linked them to banks to encourage responsible 
lending (CGAP b). These programs inspired nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to 
provide some financial services for the poor, which expanded to offer formal savings pro-
grams by the 1990s (Kiva). The United Nations declared 2005 the “International Year of 
Microcredit” to encourage global awareness and action, and in 2006 the Grameen Bank 
and Yunus jointly won the Nobel Peace Prize for their combined efforts to empower the 
poor (Kiva).
Today, microfinance is one of the most well-known and popular investment strate-
gies to lift people out of poverty. Borrowers use their loans to launch or expand small 
businesses such as farming, construction, taxi-driving, and renting out cell phones in rural 
areas. MFIs may be non-profit organizations or commercial banks, with differing attitudes 
towards the balance of financial profit and social justice. In particular, this balance causes 
112 LEVIN [Vol. 4:1 
Pursuit: The Journal of Undergraduate Research at the University of Tennessee
much controversy as critics examine the lending rates of MFIs. MFIs and traditional banks 
must offset the same lending costs (paying employees, educating borrowers, compensating 
for defaulted loans, etc.), but MFIs must offset these unavoidable costs on significantly 
smaller loans. As a result, all MFIs must charge higher interest rates on loans than tradi-
tional banks do. But since the microcredit industry is relatively new and constantly grow-
ing, individual organizations may fix lending rates largely without regulation. As a result, 
there is a poorly defined boundary between assistance and exploitation, and complaints of 
administrative corruption have surfaced in recent years. Additionally, critics question if 
microcredit can realistically be maintained as a sustainable tool for empowering the poor 
worldwide.
Case Study: India
As a country with a significant poor rural population, India has attracted many MFIs. In 
2010, India had an estimated population of 1,170,938,000 (World Bank b). In 2005, ap-
proximately 42% of Indians lived below the World Bank’s official poverty line of $1.25 
per day, and 24% below $1 per day (World Bank c). Approximately 90% of Indians lacks 
access to formal financial services, and their desire and need for microfinance has attracted 
many lending institutions (Chau 2011). In fact, “from 2003 to 2009, the number of micro-
loans extended to the poor in India grew from 1.0 million to 26.7 million” (Chau 2011). As 
of January 2011, India’s microfinance sector was valued at approximately $7 billion (Rai 
2011). Interest rates vary across the country, from an annual rate of 24-30% to the high but 
not uncommon rates of 36-120% (Biswas 2010). Until recently, the microfinance industry 
of India was highly regarded as a viable and efficient means of offering banking services 
to the poor.
Andhra Pradesh, India’s fifth largest state with an estimated population of 80 mil-
lion, is one of India’s poorest provinces and thus a major center for MFIs (World Bank a). A 
third of all loans in India are made in Andhra Pradesh alone (Rai 2011), holding a value of 
approximately $2 billion, or 80 billion rupees (Biswas 2010). The microfinance industry of 
Andhra Pradesh grew very quickly, resulting in a rapid and widespread increase of borrow-
ers who use multiple loans. In fact, about 83% of households in Andhra Pradesh received 
loans from more than one source, including moneylenders (CGAP). This phenomenon is 
troubling because it implies that borrowers were not fully aware of the magnitude of their 
various debts. The Indian government estimates that households in Andhra Pradesh have 
an average annual income of $1,060 but an average debt of $660 (Biswas, 2010).
During the summer of 2010, a number of Indians committed suicide after defaulting 
on their microloans. International media immediately focused on Andhra Pradesh because 
the state represented a large portion of India’s microfinance industry, and found that most 
of the suicide victims in Andhra Pradesh were rural farmers. Many journalists concluded 
that the suicides could be directly connected to the farmers’ inability to repay debt. The 
deaths represent the largest crisis in the history of India’s growing microfinance industry 
because they revealed deep flaws in a previously unchallenged practice. The crisis sparked 
investigations into corruption in Indian MFIs as well as research on different loan pro-
grams worldwide.
In early 2010, the microfinance industry of India began to receive a great deal 
of criticism when a major lender revealed that its major goal was the maximization of 
profit. SKS, a powerful microfinance institution throughout India, issued a document that 
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showcased the potentially enormous profit that it could make in microfinance and proposed 
considerable pay increases for company executives. The Indian media widely publicized 
the document, criticizing the company for its unabashed interest in profit. Conflict esca-
lated over the summer as more people investigated the methods and questioned the intent 
of SKS. (New York Times 2010)
During the summer of 2010, a sense of defiance grew in the borrowers, encouraged 
by politicians who “egged on [borrowers to default on their loans, accusing] the industry 
of earning outsize profits on the backs of the poor” (Bajaj 2010). Defaulting, previously 
seen as a shameful report of disability, came to represent a social statement on borrowers’ 
rights. Thus, as defaulting became a means of protesting unjust lending practices, MFIs lost 
a crucial element of their industry: the concept that the social humiliation of defaulting on 
a loan would encourage repayment. According to Mahajan, head of India’s Microfinance 
Institutions Network, loan recovery in Andhra Pradesh reached an astonishing low of 10% 
during the crisis (Rai 2011). In response, banks and investors drastically reduced fund-
ing for MFIs in order to avert major financial loss. Over just a few weeks, the nationwide 
default froze the liquid assets of local lenders by virtually stopping both loan repayment 
by borrowers and investment from larger banks (much like the subprime mortgage ‘melt-
down’ in the United States).
This crisis in confidence amplified the asset freeze in the microfinance industry. 
Indians could not access money, even long-established loans, and began to distrust their 
banks; MFIs, which depended on quick turnovers to ensure continuous expansion of 
loans, found their daily business stalled by a lack of loan applications. The microfinance 
network began to freeze as interactions between banks and borrowers virtually stopped in 
just a few months, and the microlending system of India seemed on the brink of collapse. 
(CGAP a 2010)
In October 2010, the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh released an ordinance which 
increased regulations on MFIs to prevent the industry from further disaster, and to combat 
the effects of the microfinance meltdown. He designed the legislation to protect borrowers 
by reducing irresponsible lending as well as preventing aggressive loan recovery tactics. 
But the ordinance caused an abrupt halt in the cycle of loans and repayments. As MFIs 
struggled to formulate policies that would conform to the new rules, local lending activ-
ity slowed dramatically. Lending agencies felt endangered by the low rates of repayment 
at the time, and responded by drastically cutting back on lending. Indians found that they 
suddenly had no access to even long-established loans, and lost confidence in their MFIs. 
In this environment, when the future of MFIs seemed extremely tenuous, borrowers began 
questioning their obligation to repay loans and defaults became more common.
While the microfinance industry slowed to a halt, reports of Indian suicides be-
gan to receive attention from the international media. By late 2010, over 200 Indians had 
killed themselves; significantly, all were indebted to MFIs and other lenders (Associated 
Press 2012). Onlookers interpreted the suicides as attempts to regain control in the face of 
overwhelming shame; in this case, critics argued that the Indians were ashamed of their in-
ability to repay debt. Many blamed the MFIs’ questionable lending practices for the recent 
defaults. Reports by the Indian government attribute the suicides directly to “pressure put 
by the micro-finance institutions for repayment” (Biswas 2010). But while pressure by 
lenders may have been the immediate cause of the suicides, it does not explain why the 
Indians were unable to repay their loans in the first place. The cause of the mass defaulting 
has not yet been fully determined, but most critics agree that the crisis represents a pro-
found failure on the part of MFIs.
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Vijay Mahajan, chairman of India’s Microfinance Institutions Network, stated that 
the industry’s crisis resulted from “multiple lending, over-indebtedness, coercive recovery 
practices and unseemly enrichment by promoters and senior executives” (Biswas 2010). 
In other words, Indian finance companies provided loans without fully investigating their 
clients’ ability to pay. MFIs felt highly assured of repayment because in addition to lend-
ing larger sums to more Indians, they increased interest rates to 60% and more to balance 
any losses (Rai 2011). With such liberal terms, the borrowers began using their loans for 
non-investment purposes such as paying off previous debt and drinking alcohol (Rai 2011). 
The MFIs pushed loans to more and more Indians with little regulation and allowed vil-
lagers to pile up debt as they borrowed more. To pay back their loans, villagers turned 
to unofficial lenders such as loan sharks. As repayment became more and more difficult, 
Indians protested that the system once again resembled the entrapping cycle of lending that 
Muhammad Yunus had broken. Reports surfaced that Indians were committing suicide in 
poor states because they could not repay their loans. MFIs began to pressure borrowers for 
payments to avoid financial losses, suddenly nervous that they had lent too much money 
to too many people. They employed aggressive loan recovery practices to force Indians to 
rapidly pay months’ worth of interest rates (Rai 2011). Suicides and desperation increased 
as more Indians could not repay their loans and MFIs increased pressure; these factors 
bounced back and forth until a state of crisis.
Even after the crisis had been deflated by further government interference, many 
industry authorities have concerns about the future of microfinance. MFI leaders have ex-
pressed concern that larger banks will continue to withhold funds in an effort to prevent 
major losses, should another mass defaulting occur. Additionally, they worry that those 
large institutions will pressure them to repay outstanding loans from the crisis period. If 
this occurs, the entire microcredit system could truly collapse simply because MFIs will be 
unable to withdraw money from larger institutions and thus unable to offer loans. The net-
work still faces uncertainty because the entire industry depends on the open flow of liquid 
assets from borrower to MFI, and from MFI to a larger bank; this flow depends on a trust 
which has not yet fully been restored. (Rai 2011)
On a larger scale, the global community’s perception of microfinance has been sore-
ly damaged by the crisis of Andhra Pradesh. Some critics say that these loans were not only 
irresponsible, but intentional exploitation by aggressive salesmen of poor and ill-educated 
people who lack access to certain services and therefore must rely on MFIs to avoid ex-
pensive, local, private services (Biswas 2010). If this accusation is true, such abusive poli-
cies undermine all the original values of Yunus and the foundations of microcredit. Vijay 
Mahajan, of India’s Microfinance Institutions Network, comments that “the market-driven 
business model [of microcredit] will have to be replaced with a legitimate, more sustain-
able model with social objectives” (Rai 2011).
Critique
The case study of microfinance in Andhra Pradesh suggests that the lending industry, al-
though perceived as a champion of alleviating poverty, must be evaluated by the same 
standards applied to for-profit businesses. The microfinance crisis of 2010 in India brought 
to light many issues of microfinance that were not previously addressed by the global 
community. Yet since the creation of the Grameen Bank, academics have investigated the 
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realities of microfinance, such as how to best measure the success of a program, evaluate 
potential corruption, and assess which groups are most affected by microloans. In particu-
lar, development scholars have studied microcredit in depth.
Many academics use the Grameen Bank, the model for many other lending institu-
tions, as a basis for analyzing the effectiveness of microcredit. In 2003, three economists 
published an influential article in the Journal of Development Economics which quantita-
tively assessed the Grameen Bank’s borrowers. Using data from 229 borrowers’ house-
holds, the three economists conclude that “while microcredit is successful at reaching the 
poor, it is less successful at reaching … the group most prone to destitution, the vulnerable 
poor” (Amin 2003: 59). To further criticize microfinance, other researchers have found that 
the long-term effectiveness of microlending is limited. For example, an article published 
two years later in Progress in Development Studies uses data from the Grameen Bank and 
finds a correlation between the length of time that a borrower has access to microloans and 
the effectiveness of those loans: “Our two main findings are, first, micro-credit is associ-
ated with both lower objective and subjective poverty and, secondly, the impact of micro-
credit on poverty is particularly strong for about six years with some levelling off after that 
point” (Chowdhury 2005: 298).
Another significant area of academic critique is the symbolism of microcredit in a 
neoliberal economy. Researchers such as Lamia Karim connect the roles of gender and 
economy in Bangladesh, analyzing repayment rates in the context of neoliberalism. Karim 
focuses on four major lending institutions in Bangladesh to describe “how Bangladeshi ru-
ral women’s honor and shame are instrumentally appropriated by micro-credit NGOs in the 
furtherance of their capitalist interests” (Karim 2008: 5). Although she acknowledges the 
success rates of microfinance, Karim probes the techniques used to encourage repayment 
and suggests that, although it has helped in lifting women out of poverty, microcredit fur-
thers the subjugation of Bangladeshi women by promoting the manipulation of traditional 
cultural values. Another author agrees that “microcredit thus constitutes social citizenship 
and women’s needs in a manner consistent with neoliberalism” (Ranklin 2001).
In conclusion, the microfinance crisis of Andhra Pradesh reflects many larger issues 
of microfinance around the world, such as whether MFIs should be held to international 
standards or be allowed to self-govern, how to most effectively apply the techniques of 
microlending, and how to balance profit with social justice. Most critics agree that micro-
finance is an extremely valuable tool for alleviating poverty around the world; however, 
they also conclude that lending institutions must be run very carefully to avoid such sudden 
disasters as the one that occurred in India.
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